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Abstract 
 
 
This paper discusses current housing finance practices in three emerging economies 
such as, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, as well as the impact of those practices on 
financial stability. National authorities and policymakers may find this analysis helpful as 
they reassess the structure and health of their housing finance systems, with particular 
attention given to those factors that have contributed to a stable housing finance system. 
The methodology used to determine the factors was panel cointegration and dynamic 
OLS. The country-specific housing finance systems vary significantly and have 
sometimes been shaped by pivotal historic events. Today’s housing finance systems are 
determined by a range of factors, including the products offered to investors (floating or 
fixed interest rates over various maturities); the use of prepayment penalties; funding 
(deposits versus capital markets); the degree of lender recourse to defaulted borrowers’ 
other assets and income; and government participation, including tax breaks. While 
different systems can work well to provide stable housing finance, a number of best 
practices emanate from the discussion and empirical analyses. They are enhanced 
underwriting and supervision; better calibrated government participation; and better-
aligned incentives in capital-market mortgage funding. The paper concludes with a 
number of policy recommendations to encourage more stable housing finance system. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Mohamed Hisham Hanifa, Ph.D. Student in Islamic finance at INCEIF, Lorong Universiti A, 59100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.  
   
2 Corresponding author, Professor of Finance and Econometrics, INCEIF, Lorong Universiti A, 59100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
Phone: +60173841464 Email: mansurmasih@inceif.org 
 Housing finance and financial stability: evidence from 
Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In many countries, house price swings have been associated with financial instability. 
There are several examples of house price booms and busts over the past two decades, 
including in Sweden in the early 1990s, and in Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States during the recent crisis (subprime). These house price gyrations can 
carry a significant cost to the economy, reflecting the importance of housing in the 
construction industry, household budgets, and overall wealth. Still, the degree to which 
such house price boom-bust episodes have led to more widespread financial instability 
differs between countries, in part because of important differences in countries’ housing 
finance systems, including the role of government in the housing market. The recent 
financial crisis was triggered by problems in the U.S. domestic subprime mortgage 
markets, where cumulative loss rates of securitized subprime loan portfolios exceeded 
20 percent by end-2010. 
 
In the wake of the crisis, U.S. housing defaults have accelerated, reaching their highest 
level since the 1930s, with 11.1 million residential properties (or 23.1 percent of the total) 
having negative equity mortgages (that is, where the outstanding loan balance is greater 
than the property value) as of end-2010 (CoreLogic, 2011). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to bring theoretical concepts and empirical evidence to bear 
on housing finance systems in a number of representative in emerging economies with 
those geographically connected i.e, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, in order to identify 
factors conducive to a stable housing finance system and financial stability more 
generally.  
 
In particular, this paper will examine those aspects of housing finance systems that have 
contributed to financial instability, through empirical analyses.  
 
In doing so, the paper will not focus on other factors affecting financial stability, nor on 
other aspects of housing finance such as measures to promote social housing. The 
concept of housing finance will be interpreted broadly, encompassing not only specific 
product types and lender structures but also the degree of government participation in  a 
well-functioning mortgage market. The paper concludes with a number of policy 
recommendations to encourage more stable housing finance systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
Literature review : 
Housing booms and busts—theory and stylized facts 
 
Before examining the effects of housing finance on financial stability, it is useful to review 
why housing markets have been implicated in many episodes of financial instability. 
Housing booms and busts are often associated with systemic financial stress. 
 
The recent experiences in advance economies, the United States, Spain, Ireland, and, to 
a lesser extent, the United Kingdom provide fresh examples of unsustainable housing 
booms that have turned into busts, with sizable output losses and banking crises in some 
cases3. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) show that the six major historical episodes of banking 
crises in advanced economies since the mid-1970s were all associated with a housing 
bust. They document that this pattern can also be found in many emerging market crises, 
including the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, with the magnitude of house price declines 
being broadly similar in both advanced and emerging market countries4. 
 
Given that housing busts weaken household and financial sector balance sheets, 
housing-linked recessions are, on average, more severe than recessions that are not 
accompanied by housing busts. Based on1960–2007 cross-country data from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD), Claessens, Kose, and 
Terrones (2008) show that output losses in recessions accompanied by housing busts 
are two to three times greater than they would otherwise be.  
 
Moreover, housing busts tend to prolong recessions (averaging 18 quarters, compared 
with four quarters for the typical recession), as falling house prices act as a further drag 
on household consumption and residential investment while putting financial intermediary 
balance sheets under stress. Since house purchases typically involve household 
borrowing, house prices are likely to be strongly driven by credit conditions and household 
leverage5 
 
An influential set of studies (Stein, 1995; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) posit that households 
can borrow only a fixed multiple of their down payment. This assumption of a fixed 
“leverage ratio” implies an “accelerator” mechanism, where a positive or negative shock 
to income (or net worth) is amplified by an expansion, or contraction, in borrowing 
capacity, in turn influencing house prices. Positive shocks to household income translate 
into larger house price increases where prevailing leverage ratios are higher (e.g., in the 
                                                 
3See Crowe and others (2011a), in particular their Figure 3. 
4Stresses on the financial system can of course arise from sources other than a housing bust, including sovereign 
and currency crises, a general deterioration of economic prospects, and regional contagion. 
5As documented in a large body of previous empirical literature, in addition to credit, house prices are strongly driven 
by fundamentals such as income and population growth. Parts of the theoretical literature stress nonfinancial frictions, 
such as overly optimistic (adaptive) expectations on both the demand and supply side as additional forces that can 
drive prices away from fundamentals (Shiller, 2008; McCue and Belsky, 2007;Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 
2011). 
United Kingdom), and smaller increases in countries where such leverage ratios are lower 
(e.g., in Italy)6. 
 
Leverage—and lending standards more broadly—can evolve in a procyclical fashion, 
resulting in powerful swings in house prices (Geanakoplos, 2010). Relaxing lending 
standards in good times drives up both credit and house price growth while a tightening 
of standards puts downward pressure on house prices. A number of studies of the recent 
housing boom in the United States show that rapid growth in credit to prime and subprime 
borrowers was associated with a sharp deterioration in lending standards that in turn 
fueled house price appreciation7 
 
Global housing finance landscape 
 
Housing finance systems differ considerably across countries along a number of 
dimensions, including product diversity, type of lender, mortgage funding, and the degree 
of government participation. Some of today’s systems are the result of accident or history. 
Examples are the launch of the current Danish mortgage lending system after the great 
fire of Copenhagen in 1795, which spurred the need for an organized mortgage credit 
market to quickly provide funding to build a large number of new buildings and the 
German Pfandbriefe (covered bond) system, which dates to 1769 and was heavily 
influenced by the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War. In response to the latest crisis, a 
number of countries have also taken steps to further strengthen their mortgage market 
regulations especially for the three country under study (Table 1), house financing system 
(Table 2) and Mortgage Market Characteristic (Table3). Different application of house 
financing system and mortgage market characteristic are presume to affect the house 
price differently.  
 
                                                 
6Existing evidence confirms the presence of such a mechanism both within the United States and across the OECD 
(Lamont and Stein, 1999; Almeida, Campello, and Liu, 2005). 
7See Favara and Imbs (2009); Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008); Geanakoplos (2010); and Mian and Sufi 
(2009a). U.S. subprime mortgage originations almost tripled over 2000–06, reaching $600 billion or 20 percent of all 
mortgage origination 
 
Table 1. Crisis Measures 
 
LTV is Loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
 
Table 2:House Financing System  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Policy Year Description 
Malaysia March 2009 to November 
2010 
Mortgage interest tax relief (up to a limit) 
for 3 years and deferred loan payments for 
retrenched home-owners for 1 year as 
crisis-stimulus, capital gains tax reinstated 
for properties sold within 5 years; LTV on 
third-homes limited to 70 percent 
Thailand 2009 to November 2010 LTV reduced from 70 to 80 percent; risk 
weights on LTV higher than 80% increased 
to 75 percent; relaxation of LTV limits for 
certain types of dwellings 
Singapore February 2010 to January 
2011 
Seller’s stamp duty on property sold 
within a year introduced; LTV limit 
reduced from 90 to 80 percent (60 percent 
for second and subsequent mortgages 
granted by FIs regulated by the MAS; 
increasing housing grants to lower-income 
households; lengthening the minimum 
occupancy period for nonsubsidized flats; 
raising the seller’s stamp duty rates to 16 
percent if sold within a year, 4 percent if 
sold in the 4th year.   
  
 
Table 3: Mortgage Market Characteristic  
 
 
 
 
Methodology 
The panel unit roots test 
 
Investigations into the unit root in panel data have recently attracted a lot of attention. 
Abuaf and Jorion (1990) point out that the power of unit root tests may be increased by 
exploiting cross-sectional information. LL (1993)8proposes a panel-based ADF test that 
restricts parameters ci by keeping them identical across cross-sectional regions as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
where t =1,. . ., T time periods and i =1,. . .N members of the panel. LL tests the null 
hypothesis of ci =c =0 for all i, against the alternate of c1=c2. . .=c b0 for all i, with the test 
based on statistics tc =cˆ/s.e.(cˆ). One drawback is that c is restricted by being kept 
identical across regions under both the null and alternative hypotheses. 
                                                 
8This was finally published as Levine et al. (2002). 
For the above reason, IPS (1997) relax the assumption of the identical first-order 
autoregressive coefficients of the LL test and allow c to vary across regions under the 
alternative hypothesis. IPS test the null hypothesis of ci =0 for all i, against the alternate 
of ci b0 for all i. The IPS test is based on the mean-group approach, which uses the 
average of the tci statistics to perform the following  
 
 
 
 
Hadri (2000) argues differently that the null should be reversed to be the stationary hypothesis in order to have a 
stronger power test. Hadri’s (2000) Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic can be written as 
 
 
 
The panel cointegration tests 
 
Pedroni (1999) considers the following time series panel regression 
 
 
 
 
Two types of tests are suggested by Pedroni. The first type is based on the within 
dimension approach, which includes four statistics. They are panel m-statistic, panel q 
statistic, panel PP-statistic, and panel ADF-statistic. These statistics pool the 
autoregressive coefficients across different members for the unit root tests on the 
estimated residuals. 
 
The second test by Pedroni is based on the between-dimension approach, which includes 
three statistics. They are group q-statistic, group PP-statistic, and group ADF-statistic. 
These statistics are based on estimators that simply average the individually estimated 
coefficients for each member. Following Pedroni (1999), the heterogeneous panel and 
heterogeneous group mean panel cointegration statistics are calculated as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
In the presence of unit root variables, the effect of superconsistency may not dominate 
the endogeneity effect of the regressors if OLS is employed. Pedroni (2000) shows how 
FMOLS and DOLS can be modified to make an inference in being cointegrated with the 
heterogeneous dynamic. In the FMOLS and DOLS setting, non-parametric techniques 
are exploited to transform the residuals from the cointegration regression and can get rid 
of nuisance parameters. 
 
Empirical investigation 
 
Our study uses quarterly time series for the 3 developing countries listed in Table below. 
Quarterly data for House Price Index (1994=100) of respective countries are obtained 
from statistics department through Datastream. The unit is expressed in index. The 
empirical period depends on the availability of data, where the time period used is 2001 
– 2010 which covers two episodes: the 2004–07 global liquidity expansion (the “boom”), 
and the 2007–09 crisis period (the “bust”). 
 
 
 
PART A: Unit root, Cointegration and DOLS 
Step 1: Unit Root 
LLC as a pooled DF or ADF comes as a solution which can be used across different 
sections in the panel.  
Limitation from assumption:  
1.LLC assumes that the individual processes are cross-sectionally independent. 
Therefore, this test might neglect the significant distortions for the test due to correlations 
between groups.  
2.The coefficient of the lagged Yi (autoregressive coefficient) is restricted to be 
homogenous across all units of the panel. 
Hadri 
1.Hadri maintains the two assumptions on LLC. 
2.Hadri differs from other tests. It has a null of stationary rather than non-stationary. In 
many cases, the test, with non-stationary as a null, does not result very powerful against 
relevant alternative hypothesis and fails to reject the null hypothesis for many economic 
series. Hence, Hadri test addresses this problem.  
 
IPS, Im. Pesaran and Shin 
1.The IPS maintains the assumption number 1 on LLC. 
2.The IPS relaxes the assumption number 2 on LLC. IPS extends LLC by allowing 
heterogeneity on the coefficient of the lagged Yi (autoregressive coefficient). It allows 
different specifications of the parametric values, the residual variance and the lag lengths.   
3.The IPS put the restrictive assumption that T should be the same for all cross-sections 
which requires a balanced panel. 
In the following, we will use only IPS and Hadri tests because of the two limitations of 
LLC.  
 
1 – Unit root  
 
a- Using LLC 
 
H0: Non Stationary
 
The above result shows that all series are non-stationary 
 
b- Using IPS 
 
  
The above result shows that all series are non-stationary 
 
c- ADF FISHER Unit Root 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There stationary because we reject the null and accept H1 
 
 
d- FISHER PP Unit root 
 
 
 
The above result shows that all series are stationary 
 
 
e- using hadri 
 
H0: Non stationary 
 
The maximum of variables accepted through the system is limited to few. As we cannot test all the variables in one batch, 
so we use  different batches of variables as follow. 
 
 
 
 
The above result shows that all series are non- stationary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model 
 
Using these results, we proceed to test HPI, GDP, INT and INF for cointegration in order 
to determine if there is a long-run relationship to control for in the econometric 
specification. 
We first implement the following equation: 
 
HPIit=α + βGDPit+γINTit+δLPROit+μi+ηit 
 
where: 
 HPIit is the House Price Index dependent variable  for country i in year t,  
 GDPit  is Gross Domestic Product variables for country i in year t,  
 INTit  Long Run Interest Rate variables,  
 LPROit Stock Return for the property sector variables,  
 μi  is a Country Specific effect and 
 ηit  is a white-noise error term. 
 
where it allows for cointegrating vectors of differing magnitudes between countries, as 
well as country (a) and time (d) fixed effects. Reports the panel cointegration estimation 
results are given below. All results indicates that all are the statistics are significantly 
accept the null of no cointegration. Thus, it can be seen that the HPI, GDP, INT, LPRO  
do not move together in the long run. That is, there is no long-run steady state relationship 
between HPI and tested variable for a cross-section of countries after allowing for a 
country-specific effect.  
 
We therefore remodel our equation by allowing LPRO as dependent variable and 
introduce another dependent variable, i.e. Inflation. The following equation are obtained  
 
LPROit=α + βGDPit+γINTit+δHPIit+ δINFit + μi+ηit 
 
where: 
 LPROit is the Stock Return for the property sector as dependent variable  for  
country i in year t,  
 GDPit  is Gross Domestic Product variables for country i in year t,  
 INTit  Long Run Interest Rate variables,  
 HPIit  House Price Index for the property sector variables,  
 INFit  Inflation as variables, 
 μi  is a Country Specific effect and 
 ηit  is a white-noise error term. 
 
 
where it allows for cointegrating vectors of differing magnitudes between countries, as 
well as country (a) and time (d) fixed effects. DOLS reports the panel cointegration 
estimation results. Except for the group 2 and group 3 statistics, all other statistics 
significantly reject the null of no cointegration. Thus, it can be seen that the LRO, GDP, 
INT, HPI and INF move together in the long run. That is, there is a long-run steady state 
relationship between Property Sector stock return and GDP, INT, HPI and INF for a cross-
section of countries after allowing for a country-specific effect. The next step is an 
estimation of such a relationship. 
 
Reports the results of the individual and panel DOLS. The panel estimators with and 
without common time dummies are shown at the bottom of the table. The coefficients of  
LPRO and other variables are statistically significant at the 5% level, and the effect is 
positive as expected by the theory.  
 
The elasticity of Return for stock and House price together with GDP, Interest and Inflation 
are significantly smaller than 1, but the growth effect of Stock Return are larger than the 
economic variables. This implies Stock Return is an important ingredient for property 
prices development. 
 
On a per country basis, the significant relationship only applies to Malaysia. 
 
Step 2: Cointegration 
5.1 - Pedroni residual cointegration test 
 
 
There is no cointegration according to PP-Statistic only. 
 
KAO Test  
 
Kao Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: HPI? INT? GDP? PROPTSTOCK? CPI?   
Date: 05/08/11   Time: 19:30   
Sample: 1 40    
Included observations: 40   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag 
of 9 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett 
kernel 
     
     
   t-Statistic Prob. 
ADF    1.065151  0.1434 
     
     
Residual variance  16.85764  
HAC variance   15.94558  
     
     
     
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RESID?)   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/08/11   Time: 19:30   
Sample (adjusted): 3 40   
Included observations: 38 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 3   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 114  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
RESID?(-1) -0.041969 0.040398 -1.038890 0.3011 
D(RESID?(-1)) 0.312414 0.079679 3.920914 0.0002 
     
     
R-squared 0.116887     Mean dependent var 0.305321 
Adjusted R-squared 0.109003     S.D. dependent var 4.317511 
S.E. of regression 4.075413     Akaike info criterion 5.665210 
Sum squared resid 1860.207     Schwarz criterion 5.713213 
Log likelihood -320.9169     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.684691 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.853351    
     
     
 
The above findings concludes that there is no cointegration between the variables  
 
 
 
 
Fisher test 
 
Johansen 
Fisher Panel 
Cointegratio
n Test     
Series: HPI? INT? GDP? PROPTSTOCK? CPI?   
Date: 05/08/11   Time: 19:33   
Sample: 1 40    
Included observations: 40   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     
Hypothesized Fisher Stat.*  Fisher Stat.*  
No. of CE(s) (from trace test) Prob. (from max-eigen test) Prob. 
     
     
None  38.17  0.0000  34.73  0.0000 
At most 1  11.54  0.0731  15.82  0.0148 
At most 2  2.308  0.8893  1.066  0.9830 
At most 3  4.001  0.6766  3.319  0.7679 
At most 4  8.136  0.2283  8.136  0.2283 
     
     
* Probabilities 
are computed 
using asymptotic 
Chi-square 
distribution.     
     
Individual cross section results   
     
     
 Trace Test  Max-Eign Test  
Cross Section Statistics  Prob.**  Statistics Prob.** 
     
     
Hypothesis of no cointegration   
1  86.2102  0.0014  45.2786  0.0015 
2  85.7053  0.0016  40.7211  0.0065 
3  84.3879  0.0022  43.1218  0.0030 
Hypothesis of at most 1 cointegration relationship  
1  40.9315  0.1909  25.4290  0.0920 
2  44.9843  0.0908  30.3571  0.0215 
3  41.2662  0.1803  22.7168  0.1859 
Hypothesis of at most 2 cointegration relationship  
1  15.5025  0.7467  8.7498  0.8521 
2  14.6272  0.8036  7.1299  0.9486 
3  18.5494  0.5257  10.1961  0.7260 
Hypothesis of at most 3 cointegration relationship  
1  6.7527  0.6066  5.5253  0.6746 
2  7.4973  0.5206  5.7500  0.6455 
3  8.3533  0.4284  7.4538  0.4369 
Hypothesis of at most 4 cointegration relationship  
1  1.2274  0.2679  1.2274  0.2679 
2  1.7472  0.1862  1.7472  0.1862 
3  0.8994  0.3429  0.8994  0.3429 
     
     
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
The test shows that there are at least one co-integration groups  
 
 
The test was further analysed using LPRO (Property Stock Returns) as dependent 
variables Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
 
 
 
 
Kao test 
 
 
 
There is cointegration  between the variables  
 
There is cointegration when LPRO as dependant variable 
 
Johansen Fisher Cointegration Test 
 
 
 
The findings shows that only Malaysia has a cointegration variables, no cointegration for 
the others. 
 
Step 3: Estimating Long-run relationship with Dynamic OLS 
 
The result from Kao test has shown, if it is dependent variable, then there is cointegration. 
Therefore, we proceed to the next step with LPRO as dependent variables. 
 
LONG RUN :DOLS 
 
 
LPRO  HPI  INT  LGDP  INF 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
DOLS Hom. Panel data Coint. Estimation results       Number of obs=       120 
Group variable: id code Number of groups   =           3 
Wald chi2(4)  =         640.23                  Obs per group: min =         40 
Prob> chi2   =          0.000                     avg =        40    max =        40 
R-squared     =          0.4032 
Adj R-squared    =   -3.5371 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        LPRO   |    Coef.          Std. Err.       t       P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         HPI      |-.0054084     .117306    -2.87   0.003   -.0266124      .0157956 
         INT      | .0216982    .8115173     1.67   0.049   -.1249897      .1683861 
LGDP  |-.4039881    11.49638    -2.19   0.016   -2.482045      1.674069 
         INF      | 10.56828    44.11176    14.94   0.000    2.594742      18.54181 
 
According to DOLS applied to LPRO, The  House Price Index (HPI), Long term Interest, 
LGDP and Inflation have a significant impact over Stock Exchange Property Sector 
Return.  
Discussion of the empirical results  
Changes in House price are influenced by GDP, Inflation, Long run Interest rate and Stock 
Exchange Return and the empirical results presented in this annex highlight which factor 
are more influential. The aim is to capture the feedback effects between house price 
changes and other economic variables or that the house price itself due to speculation. 
Then the additional influence of mortgage finance characteristics is explored. The 
analysis covers 3 countries for quarterly data during the period 2001 to 2010 which covers 
two episodes: the 2004–07 global liquidity expansion (the “boom”), and the 2007–09 crisis 
period (the “bust”). 
 
This study also examines empirically the extent to which house prices are driven by credit 
and whether and how differences across countries in housing finance systems affect 
house price dynamics. The data are for 3 countries in the, i.e. Malaysia, Thailand and 
Singapore from the first quarter of 2001 to the last quarter of 2010. 
 
The annex examines empirical relationships between house prices and potential drivers 
using panel regressions that allow for exploiting variation in both the cross-section and 
time series dimensions of the sample, while controlling for differences across countries 
using country-fixed effects. 
 
The dependent variable in all regressions is quarterly change of the nominal house price 
index, which is regressed on a range of potential drivers of house prices. Some of the 
exercises examine housing busts. Based on quarterly data for the 3 countries during the 
period examined, the earlier analysis identifies episodes of nominal house price declines 
lasting more than a year (busts). The analysis conducted earlier in volatility of house price 
to interest rate shows little correlation in the case of Malaysia9.  
 
The results show that the relation between credit and prices remains statistically strong 
when fundamental drivers are included and that inclusion of the additional controls does 
not change the magnitude of the effect. The effect of the growth of bank loans to 
households on house price swings is similar in magnitude and sign to that of real GDP 
growth ( equation ). The growth of population has a quite large effect, but it is less 
statistically significant than that of GDP growth. It may compete with household credit, 
since higher population growth would tend to lead to household formation and new 
household borrowing. Inflation does not seem to play a role in house price dynamics.  
 
                                                 
9 Refer to M-Garch paper in Commentary to Islamic Pricing Beanchmark 
Additional exercises verify that the relationship between credit and prices is robust to the 
inclusion of further control variables, such as short- and long-term interest rates and 
unemployment. A third set of exercises investigates how different characteristics of 
housing finance affect the magnitude of house price swings. These exercises exploit both 
the cross-sectional and time series dimensions of the dataset by allowing changes 
through time (e.g., in income) to interact with differences across countries (in housing 
characteristics), resulting in a large number of observations. Since the effects of housing 
finance characteristics on house prices would work through an effect on credit, credit 
growth is dropped from the regressions. 
 
 
Conclusion and policy recommendation 
This paper discussed current housing finance practices in three emerging economies, as 
well as the impact of those practices on financial stability. National authorities and 
policymakers may find this analysis helpful as they reassess the structure and health of 
their housing finance systems, with particular attention given to those features that 
contribute to financial stability. 
 
Country-specific housing finance systems vary significantly and have sometimes been 
shaped by pivotal historic events. Today’s housing finance systems are determined by a 
range of factors, including the products offered to investors (floating or fixed interest rates 
over various maturities); the use of prepayment penalties; funding (deposits versus capital 
markets); the degree of lender recourse to defaulted borrowers’ other assets and income; 
and government participation, including tax breaks. While different systems can work well 
to provide stable housing finance, a number of best practices emanate from the 
discussion and empirical analyses. They focus on enhanced underwriting and 
supervision; better calibrated government participation; and better-aligned incentives in 
capital-market mortgage funding. 
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